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Abstract: The military establishment plays an important role in society, not only because it is pivotal 
in securing the state from external and internal threats but also because the conduct of soldiers affect 
the fortunes of the state both fiscally and morally. Early in their career, soldiers are trained to be 
irreproachable in their loyalty, unquestioning in their obedience and unthinking in their pursuit of 
military objective. This, however changes as they move up into command positions and are required 
to decide on objectives as well as give orders for others to obey. For many officers, this is usually a 
difficult transition to make even though Staff School training is supposed to enable them to make this 
transition. This paper is based on an attempt to introduce philosophical dialogue to student officers of 
a military academy to help them make this difficult transition. It discusses the use of philosophical 
dialogue in facilitating officers’ understanding of important issues in the military, including military 
decision making.  It highlights the procedure, difficulties and dangers of facilitating philosophical 
dialogue between soldiers especially as it relates to the corporate unity and command structure of the 
military. The paper also reflects on the efficacy and desirability of involving soldiers in a dialogue 
process. 
Keywords: Decision making, Military training, MDMP (Military Decision Making Process), 
Philosophical Dialogue,  
 
Resumen: La institución militar y juega un papel importante en la sociedad, no sólo porque es una 
base crucial para la seguridad del estado frente a amenazas internas y externas sino porque la 
conducta de los soldados afecta al destino del estado tan física como moralmente. Al comienzo de sus 
carreras, los soldados son entrenados en el desarrollo de una lealtad indubitable, evitando el 
cuestionamiento y la crítica para incentivar el desarrollo de los objetivos militares. Esta situación 
cambia cuando asciende a posiciones superiores, donde se requiere que decidan sobre la consecución 
de ciertos objetivos y que den órdenes a otros. Para muchos oficiales, esto supone una difícil 
transición a pesar de que la escuela de oficiales se supone que los capacita para realizar esta 
transición. Este artículo pretende explicar cómo introducir el diálogo filosófico a los estudiantes que 
se preparan para ser oficiales en la academia militar, actividad que les ayudará a desenvolver esta 
complicada transición. El trabajo discute el uso del diálogo filosófico para facilitar a los oficiales la 
comprensión de los asuntos militares importantes, lo cual abarca la toma de decisión militar. 
Subrayará, el procedimiento, las dificultades y los peligros de facilitar un diálogo filosófico entre los 
soldados, particularmente cuando se dirige a la unidad militar y a la estructura de órdenes del 
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ejército. Además, esta investigación reflexiona sobre la eficacia y deseabilidad de incorporar a los 
soldados en un proceso dialógico. 
Palabras clave: Toma de decisión, entrenamiento militar, Proceso de toma de decisión militar 





The war profession is a very serious business, not only because it is a 
matter of life and death for the officers and men of the military but also 
for the nation state whose continued existence and independence 
sometimes depends upon the prowess of its military.  Second, it is a 
serious business because the deployment of military personnel for combat 
operations has an impact on society not just because it has to live with the 
emotional scars of raising children of deceased or maimed soldiers but 
also because it has to contend with the physical and emotional scars that 
result from the prosecution of war. It is in recognition of the enormity of 
this responsibility that nations expend a sizable chunk of their resources 
to train and equip its military. The assumption here is that a well trained 
and equipped military will better contain the enemies of the state and may 
thus avoid or at least reduce the physical, emotional, socio-political and 
economic fallouts of being second best in a military engagement. The 
political establishment in states with extensive military prowess 
sometimes assume an arrogant stance in their relationship with others 
based on their belief that their military can stand up to the best. But those 
who actively engage in prosecuting wars know that warfare is not only 
precarious but is also unpredictable. This is because the size of an army is 
no guarantee of victory and the sophistication of weaponry does not 
readily translate into military supremacy. This is why discerning rulers 
abhor warfare and use an intricate system of conventional ties and treaties 
to keep its officers and men in the barracks. But part of the 
unpredictability of war is that it is sometimes visited on those who 
earnestly abhor it, such that pacifism by a nation cannot guarantee it 
peace. Thus even when a nation earnestly abhors war, reason dictates that 
it prepare its forces to defend it from rumblings within and perils from 
afar.  
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A professional army is not merely a group of armed men and women 
that is mustered to defend the interest of a state but should ideally be a 
professional group that is highly trained in “certain skills and perhaps 
even a sense of responsibility to exercise these skills in certain ways and 
at certain times.”1 This is important because it is only when an army is 
properly trained in all aspects of the conduct of war that it is capable of 
protecting the state from internal and external threats. It is also proper 
training that ensures that a military does not turn its enormous capacity 
for violence on the state and its citizens. But training does not only 
consist in developing proficiency in the deployment of men and material 
but also extends to the capacity do so within the ambits of national laws 
and international conventions. Thus, whereas having the capacity for 
violence and developing proficiency at deploying men and material may 
be adequate for success at a tactical level, managing violence, which 
Harold Lasswell refers to as the peculiar skill and defining feature of a 
professional soldier, requires much more than the ability to deploy 
military resources. This paper is about the enhanced military training that 
helps officers in the management of violence. It evaluates the processes 
and outcomes of integrating philosophical practice into military training, 
especially as it relates to the attempt to introduce philosophical dialogue 
into the military decision making process. It makes a distinction between 
the two types of military decisions to which philosophical dialogue may 
be applied, viz., ethical and tactical decisions and examines the processes 
through which philosophical dialogue may be employed appropriately. It 
examines the relative success of the dialogue process in their ethical and 
tactical applications and the difficulties of making decisions in time-
critical-situations.  In conclusion, it argues that while the dialogue 
process helps in sharpening the critical thinking capacities and 
contributes to the general intellectual alertness of the soldier, it may not 





                                                          
1 FOTION, N. - ELFSTROM, G.: Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1986, p. 48 
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Training and the Military 
 
Although the ultimate aim of any military formation is to deter enemies 
of the state or otherwise subdue such enemies that are undeterred, doing 
so with finesse is usually the goal of every military and it is this finesse 
that is usually referred to as professionalism. As Sarkesian observes, “the 
label, professional is a mark of distinction. Not only does it indicate an 
exceptional competence but also a commitment to a particular lifelong 
career.”2 This distinction is highly priced by every military not just for 
itself but also as honour to the country that promotes and sponsors it. To 
ensure professionalism different armies develop complex training 
programmes at all levels to enhance its physical, mental and technical 
readiness. For people outside the military, the most visible part of this 
training is the fitness training which involves drill, physical training, 
weapons handling, field craft, and first aid and is usually characteristic of 
military training at the lower ranks. At this level of training, the primary 
aim is to socialize the men into the military culture of the particular army 
formation. This is because “a soldier’s physical survival and vulnerability 
to psychological attrition, as well as the successful accomplishment of the 
unit’s mission, depends to a large measure upon the extent to which 
cooperative and mutually supportive interpersonal relationships prevail in 
the small unit.”3 Thus, at this level of training, emphasis is laid on 
obedience, honour, teamwork, and dedication to duty within a strict 
hierarchical system. This is necessary not only to enable the soldier 
perform under the stress of battle but also to cocoon him against such 
praetorian tendencies that could easily mislead a soldier. Thus training at 
this level is highly regimented with tightly scheduled routines and the 
strict enforcement of several regulations relating to physical health, 
equipment care, personal conduct and unit cohesion. 
Beyond this level of training lies a more sophisticated and technical 
level of education which is reserved for a section of the officer corps and 
is geared towards helping war professionals to excel in command and 
                                                          
2 SARKESIAN,S. C.: Beyond the Battlefield: The new Military Professionalism, Pergamon Press,  
NYC, 1981, p. 5 
3 GAL, R.: A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier, Greenwood Press, NYC, 1986, p. 235 
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staff responsibilities. Commenting on the aim of the United Kingdom’s 
Joint Service Command and Staff College, Till et. al.4 observes that the 
“Advance Course is to prepare officers for high-grade command and staff 
appointments over the next 10 years of their careers. Such appointments 
are likely to include command, headquarters’ staff posts, policy, 
acquisitions and finance.” Training at this level usually exerts severe 
physical and mental stress upon the officer and is meant to sharpen his 
command capabilities and enable him to make wise, sensitive, ethically 
legitimate and life changing decisions while operating in a complex, 
ambiguous and unpredictable military environment. The understanding 
here is that neither extreme mental and physical suffering nor fatigue and 
injury should prevent the officer from making sound tactical decisions. 
Officer training at this level, however, is not limited to the development 
of tactical competence but also involves the intellectual development of 
the officer. This is achieved through a broadening of the military 
curriculum by including courses in logical and critical thinking, human 
rights and international relations, politics, the economy, social and 
cultural issues. Such intellectual development “highlights the invaluable 
benefits of sound institutional education in non-military disciplines as 
well as education and training specifically targeted for various 
organizational levels. This view contends that institutions which instil the 
value of intellectual broad-mindedness, rigor, and freedom will produce 
members capable of sound critical thinking.”5 
The specific emphasis on developing the critical thinking capacity of 
the officer is based on the understanding that critical thinking adds value 
to officers and broadens their mind-set, not only in the area of military 
operations but also in terms of their moral and social responsibilities. As 
Cardon and Leonard put it,  
 
Critical thinking derives from purposeful, reflective judgment and reasoning, and 
drives the continuous learning essential to adaptation in design. Creative thinking 
                                                          
4TILL, G. - BOWEN, W. - HALL, D. - Burridge Air Vice-Marshal Brian, “Post modern Military 
education: Are we meeting the challenge”? Defence Studies vol 1:1, London, 2001,  pp.  xii. 
5 PAZ, Major Richard D.: A Systems Critique of the Military Decision-Making Process at the 
Operational Level of War, Unpublished  Monograph, United States Army,  School of Advanced 
Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas,2003, p. 34 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 6, 2015, pp. 29-51 
IBANGA B. IKPE 
 
34
fosters innovation by capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. In 
applying critical and creative thinking, continuous dialog and collaboration help 
to develop a shared understanding of the situation and the operational 
environment while improving upon the often-flawed nature of individual thought. 
Critical thinking involves asking appropriate questions, gathering relevant 
information, deriving sound conclusions, and effectively communicating the 
essence of those conclusions to others6   
 
In other words there is a belief in the military that an officer with a 
capacity to think is an asset to the command. There is also the belief that 
the use of collaborative thinking leads to better decisions and therefore 
benefits the men, the military establishment and the nation that 
established and sustains the military. 
 
 
Decision Making in the Military  
 
The military establishment is structured in a hierarchal manner in order to 
maintain the level of discipline required in an effective military 
formation. This arrangement ensures a strict chain of command from the 
highest military officer, through the intervening structures, to the men 
that constitute the rank and file. This strict hierarchy ensures that it is 
only officers with an appropriate level of training, education and 
experience that make decisions for the rest of the organization.  This is 
important because of the need to ensure that military decisions reflect the 
culture of the particular military, the policies of the state, and the virtues 
of international military norms. As  Eriksen observes, “the fact that a 
single wrong response may have huge consequences for the armed 
conflict, both on a military operational and political level, contributes 
further to the importance of good decision-making.”7 In order to ensure 
that command decisions are appropriate for designated purposes and that 
the officers who issue such commands are sufficiently equipped to do so, 
further education and training are made mandatory for the higher ranks. 
                                                          
6 CARDON, Brigadier General (P) Edward C., and LEONARD, Lieutenant Colonel Steve, 
Unleashing Design: Planning and the Art of Battle Command, Military Review, Vol, 16.  March-
April 2010, p. 6  
7 ERIKSEN, Jørgen Weidemann, “Should Soldiers Think before They Shoot?” Journal of Military 
Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2010, p. 196 
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This usually begins with the Staff college education and is meant to equip 
officers for decision making roles within the military. It is not only 
designed to increase the general and tactical knowledge of the officer but 
also to imbue him with the right dispositions, attitudes, habits of mind, 
and character traits. This is especially important because the military 
decisions that matter are made in time-critical situations when officers are 
under intense physical and mental stress. Since individual military 
officers are likely to approach issues differently, Staff College education 
is structured to ensure that officers operate within appropriate world 
views and that their decisions are not left to their individual whims and 
caprices. 
The importance of making the right military decisions has been 
evident throughout history. The rise and fall of nations as well as the 
influence that nation-states exert on world affairs are often linked to its 
military prowess and by extension, the tactical ingenuity of its 
commanders. Early military commanders like Julius Caesar, Hannibal 
Barca and Napoleon Bonaparte, as well as more recent ones such as 
Erwin Rommel, George Patton, Bernard Montgomery displayed tactical 
ingenuity that led to highly successful military careers. Their battlefield 
exploits did not only recommended them to their superiors but also 
earned them the respect of their enemies. Commanders such as Caesar 
were not only expected to make important tactical decisions personally 
but were required by circumstances, to do so. This ensured that his full 
military ingenuity was utilized in every offensive and that responsibility 
for success or failure rested solely with him. In such early warfare, it was 
possible for the commander to make important decisions by himself 
because, though they sometimes commanded large armies, warfare was 
simple and restricted to formal battlefields where combatants faced each 
other across clearly defined battle lines. Military acumen merely involved 
outmanoeuvring and annihilating the enemy on that battle field and 
thereafter inheriting swaths of territory that, hitherto, belonged to the 
enemy. Such ingenuity not only resulted in great personal wealth for 
commanders but also brought them into the political mainstream as 
governors of conquered territories or lawmakers. Contemporary military 
commanders, irrespective of their ingenuity are not expected to make 
military decisions alone. The complexity of contemporary warfare, 
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coupled with the large size of forces and advances in technology entail 
more information and calculation8 that cannot be processed by any one 
person. Thus, though contemporary military decision making still 
remains the responsibility of particular military commanders, whose full 
genius  is sometimes reflected in the decisions, the process of making 
such decisions is heavily regulated by the military establishment and 
often requires the contribution of officers and staff under the commander. 
Regulation by the military establishment often entails the adoption of 
standardized decision making procedures such as the Military Decision 
Making Process (MDMP), the Command Estimate Process and the Troop 
Leading Procedures. The oversight enforced by these procedures ensures 
that the command hierarchy maintains a semblance of control of all 
decision irrespective of the nature of the command environment. 
The Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) is a standardized 
reasoning calculus used by many military establishments to ensure 
precision and uniformity in military decision making. It is an analytical 
tool “employing a time-intensive, but logical sequence to analyze the 
situation, develop a range of options, compare these options, and then 
select the option that best solves the problem.”9 It usually entails the 
commander and his staff officers using the men and material available to 
them at any given time to accomplish a set mission. It emphasizes and 
acknowledges the expertise of staff officers and portrays them as 
indispensable to the overall success of the mission. In planning the 
mission, the commander seeks the contributions of such staff officers as 
in intelligence, logistics, air support, artillery, infantry, etc. and uses their 
contributions in the planning process. The plan ends up reflecting the 
perspectives of the different experts and is said to be superior to any plan 
that could have been made independently by the commander. In 
employing the calculus there is an assumption that if sustained and 
appropriate reasoning is applied to a military objective, such an objective 
could be achieved efficiently. The MDMP consists of seven steps: 
                                                          
8 GARCIA, Maj. Jacob A., The Requirement for an Abbreviated Military Decision-Making Process 
in Doctrine, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California, 
1980, p. 1 
9 MARR, Major John J., The Military Decision Making Process: Making Better Decisions Versus 
Making Decisions Better, Unpublished monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United 
States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
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Step 1 - Receipt of Mission 
Step 2 - Mission Analysis 
Step 3 - Course of Action Development 
Step 4 - Course of Action Analysis 
Step 5 - Course of Action Comparison 
Step 6 - Course of Action Approval 
Step 7 - Orders Production 
Although a few of the tasks of the MDMP appear perfunctory and 
predictable, there is no doubt that a majority of the other tasks require 
purposeful and reflective judgment which is the hallmark of critical 
thinking. The assumption here is that the enemy is thinking, innovative 
and unpredictable and will employ every possible guile in pursuing his 
objective. Critical thinking, therefore, is indispensable and this is 
underscored by Cardon and Leonard when they argue; 
 
Critical thinking also helps distil the immense amounts of information and 
determine those elements of information that are most relevant to the situation. 
This is an important step in mitigating the risk associated with guidance that does 
not fully account for the complexities of the operational environment. Critical 
thinking helps to clarify guidance and enables commanders to achieve a mutual 
understanding of the current situation and the desired end state.10  
      
The above emphasizes the fact that it is the field commanders that are 
conversant with the operational environment and should therefore be in a 
position to creatively interpret the warning order (WngO) that they 
receive from headquarters. The MDMP therefore encourages the use of 
Critical thinking by operational planning team to make decisions on the 
basis of a thorough analysis of the enemy and the combat environment. 
Although the MDMP emphasizes critical thinking in operational 
planning, the circumstance of military operations sometimes makes such 
thinking impracticable. Also, one could argue that military culture 
predisposes officers and men to operate within time tested parameters, 
thereby avoiding the adventitious reasoning that is associated with critical 
thinking.  In their cadet training for instance, officer cadets are instilled 
with the culture of obedience which Huntington refers to it as the 
                                                          
10 CARDON, and Leonard, op.cit., 2010, p. 6. 
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“supreme military virtue.”11  In obeying an order, a subordinate forgoes 
critical judgment in the selection of alternatives and "uses the formal 
criterion of the receipt of a command or signal as his basis of choice."12 
Cadet Officers are made to understand that they should defer to the 
superior knowledge and experience of the commander, trusting that the 
net effect of carrying out the command will be beneficial to all 
concerned. A culture of obedience is important, not only because it 
ensures the cohesion that a military needs when confronting a set 
objective but also because such a unity of purpose translates into 
efficiency and efficacy. This culture of obedience is sometimes carried 
over into command and staff positions and acts as a disincentive for 
critical judgments and the entertainment of opinions. Some officers 
would rather recycle a judgment made by their superior in a similar 
circumstance or adopt a position from the military operational manual 
than make a critical judgment of their own. Another disincentive for 
critical judgement, in officers assuming command and staff 
responsibilities for the first time, is the need to avoid blame for 
operational failures. A failure to achieve a command objective sometimes 
entails catastrophic outcomes which weigh heavily on the officer 
responsible. Blame for such failure would be mediated if the decision is 
based on ideas that emanate from the rule book or from what has been 
done in the past but would be severe if it is a novel idea that emanates 
from critical judgment of the officer. This is to say that critical judgment 
and the resultant new approach to a mission is fine, so long as it achieves 
its set objective and since no one can say for certain when actions derived 
from such critical judgment will achieve its set objective, officers are 
more likely to make “safe” decisions rather than make decisions that are 
reasonable but fall outside the dictates of their rulebook. Thus whereas in 
making decisions, commanders are expected to be guided by professional 
judgement gained from experience, knowledge, education, intelligence 
and intuition, this is not always the case in reality. This is especially so 
for officers that are new to command responsibilities. Their lack of 
experience sometimes makes them unsure of their capabilities and casts 
                                                          
11 HUNTINGTON, Samuel P.: The Soldier and the State, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 74 
12 COCKERHAM William C. and COHEN,  Lawrence E., “Obedience to Orders: Issues of Morality 
and Legality in Combat among U.S. Army Paratroopers”,  Social Forces, Vol. 58: 4 (1980), p. 1273. 
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doubts over their intelligence and intuitions. They are, therefore, more 
likely to avoid critical judgement and more likely to try to second guess 
the kind of decision that their superiors would expect in the circumstance, 
or stick to what has worked in the past.  
But even where a commander or staff officer wants to use critical 
judgment in making innovative decisions on military strategy they may 
be handicapped by the limited alternatives that standard military training 
accords them. This is not to say that soldiers are not sufficiently 
intelligent or that they do not apply their mind appropriately to their task 
but it is saying that what is considered as alternatives in the military, just 
as it is in everyday life, is limited. For instance, when faced with a 
decision about starting a family, most people think of it in terms of 
getting married and having children. Few consider adoption, cohabiting, 
homosexual coupling and single parenting as reasonable alternatives.  In 
the same way, when faced with the question of how to engage an enemy, 
a commander should not think that their alternatives are limited to either 
attacking or not attacking. They should also consider a retreat, a siege, 
infiltration, psychological warfare and sabotage as viable alternatives. 
Developing a capacity for identifying alternatives therefore becomes 
indispensable especially in an ethical military that can ill afford to waste 
its human and material resources. Such a development is only possible at 
the level of the staff college where the officer is guided by the directing 
staff and other instructors and also has the support of his college 
colleagues. It is also within such a setting that the viability of dialogue as 
tool in the development of critical judgements can be explored.  
 
 
Philosophical Dialogue in Military Training 
 
The need for philosophical dialogue in military training arises from the 
special circumstances of contemporary warfare, especially with the 
intersection of ethical and operational issues in military decision making. 
Military commanders of the past did not have to contend with ethical 
issues even though the culture of chivalry made them mindful of some of 
them. Early writers on military strategy such as Sun Tzu and Hsün Tzu 
merely dwelt on the strategy for winning wars, without any 
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complimentary discussion of ethics. They did not have to contend with 
the growth in information technology and the attendant increase in the 
advocacy for human rights which has brought the activity of soldiers 
under such stringent scrutiny that, the popular dictum that “all is fair in 
love and war” is no longer valid in warfare. International restrictions on 
warfare, such as the ban on the use of anti-personnel land mines and 
chemical weapons, show that the methods of war are now as important as 
victory itself. Military events like the firebombing of Dresden, the Mai 
Lai massacre and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which 
were accepted as the collateral damage of war, would probably be looked 
upon differently in today’s world of human rights advocacy. This is why, 
when preparing officers for command and staff appointments, it is 
important to emphasize the fact that military decision making is no longer 
focused only on tactical issues but also involves ethical and 
environmental issues. For an African military, such decisions are further 
complicated by the presence of irregular combatants and child soldiers in 
the theatre as well as the use of unorthodox combat methods. The need 
for philosophical dialogue arises because, since Socratic times, it has 
been known to improve the quality of reasoning and by extension the 
quality of decisions that follow from such reasoning. The following is an 
attempt to see whether such dialogue could help the quality of military 
decisions and emanates from an attempt to use philosophical dialogue to 
sharpen the decision making abilities of student-officers in a military 
college. The aim of the dialogue is not as much to find an appropriate 
decision as it is to explore the various options that are available. The 
dialogue is expected to improve the quality of command by helping the 
student officer to develop an in-depth understanding of the Military 
Decision Making Process and the ethical issues that arise both in combat 
and peace time. 
Introducing philosophical dialogue to student officers usually starts 
with an attempt to resolve serious ethical issues that arise within the 
conduct of war. The intention is not usually to find a solution to the issues 
but rather to broaden the perspectives of the officers involved so that they 
could better understand the issue and take it into account in operational 
planning. As a background to this, student officers are given a brief 
introduction to philosophical dialogue. For this purpose, philosophical 
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dialogue is regarded, not as “a conversation in which two people equally 
committed to and fluent in philosophy disagree about a fundamental 
issue”13 but rather as a conversation between two people who disagree 
with each other on an issue but are equally committed to exploring 
different alternatives with the hope of finding one that is best suited for 
the circumstance surrounding the issue. It is important to emphasize that 
such a dialogue is not the exclusive preserve of philosophers but could 
take place between any two reasonably intelligent people who genuinely 
seek to discover hidden meanings and explore various possibilities 
concerning any subject matter. Also, it is important to emphasize that the 
issue to which philosophical dialogue is applied need not be fundamental 
in the philosophical sense but can relate to any situation where there is 
need for a better understanding. Again, for our purpose, it is important to 
make it clear that philosophical dialogue extends beyond the clarification 
of concepts to problem solving. Thus while the dialogue may not 
necessarily find a solution to ethical dilemmas in the conduct of war, it 
can result in a better understanding of the issue and thus help 
commanders to make decisions that are reasonable within the context of a 
particular military engagement.       
A traditional approach to demonstrating the efficacy of philosophical 
dialogue in the clarification of thought would have been through the 
dialogues of Plato which would also have helped the student-officers to 
familiarize themselves with the dialogue process. In this case, the 
dogfight in Plato’s Gorgias between Socrates and Callicles in their 
attempt to establish the true meaning of ‘justice’ seemed especially 
appealing but the diction, length, context and content of the dialogue 
were a disincentive. As alternatives, short dialogues of varying length and 
content were adopted. The first, based on a supposed dialogue between 
Snoop Dogg and Thales of Miletus14 is relatively simple and was used to 
introduce student-officers to the dialogue process. This was followed by a 
longer and more intense dialogue titled “An example of philosophical 
                                                          
13 ROOCHNIK,  David L.: The Impossibility of Philosophical Dialogue, Philosophy & Rhetoric  Vol. 
19, No. 3, 1986, p. 148 
14 CHICAGO MILITARY ACADEMY, E4AP: “Philosophy: Philosopher Dialogue”, available 
online at 
http://www.chicagomilitaryacademy.org/ourpages/auto/2007/9/23/1190595536921/Philosophy%20di
alogue%20example.doc, last accessed 15/4/2008. 
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discussion / Free Will and Determinism,”15 and finally by David and 
Stephanie Lewis’s Holes16. The purpose was to introduce and gradually 
get the student-officers to be more conversant with the dialogue process 
before being asked to engage in their own dialogue. Although the above 
dialogues deal with fundamental philosophical issues whose content and 
context would not have been appropriate for fighting men, their 
simplicity and the fact that the interlocutors appear to be ordinary 
everyday people made them ideal for the purpose. In studying the 
dialogues, student-officers were encouraged to relate to the issues raised 
and identify with the position of one of the characters.  
The actual dialogue in which the student-officers participate started 
with the instructor leading the dialogue through questions and student-
officers trying to establish the truth as they answer and comment on the 
questions. It involved a re-enactment of Bertrand Russell’s “Appearance 
and Reality” where the question is posed as to whether there is any 
knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable person 
could doubt it. The dialogue progresses with student officers identifying 
knowledge that they adjudge to be indubitable and the instructor taking 
them through a series of questions to the realization that such knowledge 
could actually be doubted. The instructor performs this role over five 
different knowledge ascriptions before asking the student officers to 
continue with the dialogue on their own. For this purpose, the twenty 
student-officers were divided into groups of four with two members of 
each group identifying something which in their opinion could be known 
without doubt and the other two members trying to identify 
circumstances under which such knowledge could be doubted. At the end 
of each dialogue, the group members change roles and re-enact the 
process. The instructor moves around the groups to observe the dialogues 
and offers suggestions as appropriate. After two full length dialogues the 
student-officers reassemble to discuss their experience with the dialogues 
and ask questions concerning the dialogue process and their progress. 
This process is repeated several times until the instructor is satisfied that 
                                                          
15 VILKKA, Jouni: “An example of philosophical discussion / Free Will and Determinism”, available 
online at http://personal.inet.fi/koti/jouni_vilkka/ExampleDialogue.htm, lasr accessed 15/4/2008 
16 LEWIS, David & LEWIS, Stephanie; Holes, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 48:2, 1970, pp. 
206-212 
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student-officers had a full grasp of the process of using dialogue to 
expand one’s horizons about a specific issue. This session served the dual 
purpose of familiarizing student officers with the dialogue process and 
exposing them to the infinite possibilities that are discoverable through 
dialogue. 
The next step was to use dialogue to understand and form an opinion 
on an issue in military ethics. For this purpose, a recurrent ethical issue 
for the African military - the presence of child soldiers in a theatre of 
operations – was chosen for exploration. The main issue in the dialogue 
was whether or not an officer should order the use of lethal force on a 
group of child soldiers. In the dialogue process, one section of the group 
proposes and actively defends the point of view while the other section 
asks questions, seeks clarifications, criticizes, and generally engages the 
other group in an attempt to arrive at a position that is acceptable to all. 
The initial response to the question as to whether child soldiers should be 
visited with lethal force was an overwhelming yes and it appeared that 
both sections of the class felt there should be no further progress with the 
dialogue. The primary focus of their argument was that child soldiers 
present an imminent danger to the men and mission; therefore, there 
should be no hesitation in visiting them with lethal force. This unanimity 
of views and the danger of an impromptu end to the dialogue forced the 
instructor to intervene by introducing the UN definition of child soldiers 
and using dialogue to explore the definition with student-officers. The 
UN definition of a child soldier as “any child – boy or girl – under 18 
years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force 
or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, 
porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than 
family members. It includes girls and boys recruited for forced sexual 
purposes and/or forced marriage”17 led to a significant revision of 
opinion. The idea that a child soldier is not always an armed combatant 
contributed to a rethink of the initial position and played a vital role in its 
reversal. While some were ready to visit lethal force on armed child 
soldiers, they were not so ready to do the same for unarmed youths who, 
while not armed were strategic to the success of the enemy force. Again 
                                                          
17 UNICEF, Factsheet: Child Soldiers, available online at 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdf, last accessed 14/05/13 
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the idea that child soldiering is not always voluntary on the part of the 
children led to a drawn out debate where, for the first time, they were 
seen as victims rather than adventurers or mischief makers.  
The idea that a child soldier is not always an irregular combatant but 
can be part of the regular army was introduced by the instructor and this 
further complicated the issue. The dialogue then turned to whether or not 
a 16 year old who voluntarily enlists in an army and has received full 
military training could be regarded as a victim in the same way as a 16 
year old that has been abducted by an armed group and forced to fight. 
Variations in the circumstance of a 16 year old who enlists in the military 
were discussed. For instance a 16 year-old whose mother is suffering 
from a chronic illness and he enlists in the military because he needs the 
money for the mother’s medical treatment. Suppose our 16 year old is 
really a pacifist but has been conscripted into the military? Then there 
was the question as to whether it would make any difference if the 16 
year old is not combat personnel but rather belonged to the medical corps, 
corps of engineers or logistics. Student-officers explored the 
circumstances where 16 years of age would be a mitigating factor in 
deciding whether or not to use lethal force on a child within a regular 
army. To further enrich the dialogue, the instructor introduced the idea 
that child soldiers, by virtue of their age, are protected by several 
international conventions (including, the Four Geneva Conventions 
(1949), the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (1977), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), regional 
agreements (e.g. the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child 1990), the Convention 182 of the International Labour 
Organisation concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) and the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement 
of children in armed conflict (2000)among others.18 The idea that child 
soldiers are not legally and morally culpable for their actions also raised 
concerns. Does a military engagement with children constitute a war 
crime, especially given the risk posed by child combatants who, despite 
their age are skilled in military manoeuvres and have been known to 
                                                          
18 DRUBA, Volker,  “The Problem of Child Soldiers”, International Review of Education, Vol. 48: 
3/42002, p. 272 
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pursue military objectives without inhibitions? Is it not the responsibility 
of states to protect its children and as such in a situation where one is on a 
peace enforcement mission is one absolved of such responsibility? 
In the end, student-officers agreed that tactical and ethical decisions 
concerning child soldiers were not as simple as they initially appeared. 
But even more important was the fact that this conclusion was reached 
following philosophical dialogue by the student-officers who provided 
valuable insights to the issues discussed. The success of this initial 
dialogue laid the foundation for other dialogues on issues related to 
military ethics. Ethical and tactical problems relating to obedience 
(including illegal orders), regimentation, conscientious objection, sexual 
harassment and discrimination as well as homosexuality formed part of 
subsequent dialogues. In each case the dialogue was undertaken from a 
command perspective, in other words, what a commander would do when 
confronted with a situation. The issue of sexual harassment was 
approached from the perspective of harassment both within (when a 
soldier within ones command harasses another) and outside (when a 
member of the public reports harassment) the force and were considered 
in the context of peace and war. In these subsequent dialogues, student-
officers were divided into two groups, with each group representing a 
different opinion on the issue. In all cases, the instructor was on hand to 
interject questions and introduce new trends when it appeared that a 
particular trend in the dialogue is no longer fruitful.  
After a series of dialogues on issues that form part of the military 
ethics curriculum, student-officers were required to write and submit a 
dialogue of not less than two thousand words on an ethical issue relating 
to the speciality of the officer and arising from within a theatre of 
operations. As part of the preparation for writing their own dialogues, 
student-officers were encouraged to organise a conversation with their 
peers (who may or may not be members of the class) around the issue of 
their dialogue and record the conversation so that it could be analysed. 
The written dialogue however, is not supposed to be a mere transcript of 
the conversation but may be developed based on the discussions. In 
developing the dialogue, each of the characters should be presented as 
intelligent and discerning. He should be in a position to build good 
arguments that contribute meaningfully to the dialogue and not simply be 
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a straw-man that is refuted by the philosopher. They should be shown to 
be capable of criticising the central view of the discussion and making the 
dialogue philosophically interesting. The goal of the dialogue should not 
be to make one character appear more philosophically sophisticated than 
the others but rather to engender mutual understanding and appreciation 
of the issues in the dialogue. 
The final stage in the use of philosophical dialogue in military 
training is to apply it to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). 
At this point, student-officers should already be well versed in the 
dialogue process to be able to apply it in war-gaming. The process 
usually starts with the receipt of a mission from higher headquarters. 
Following the MDMP the commander with his Chief of Staff (COS) or 
Second in Command (2ic), using the Standing Operating Procedure 
(SOP) are expected to make an initial assessment of the mission in order 
to determine what will be required for the operation. Student officers in 
staff colleges are introduced to such command duties during war-gaming 
within which real battle situations are simulated and student-officers are 
required to make decisions as they would in real war situations. Since 
war-gaming is a closed military affair, the extent to which philosophical 
dialogue helps tactical decision making can only be assessed indirectly by 
asking student-officers and the Directing Staff (DS) to report on it. In 
conducting the initial assessment of the mission, the general feeling was 
that sustained dialogue concerning the objective was not useful since the 
tasks involved where perfunctory and as such could not be refined and 
improved with dialogue. This is because officers are merely expected to 
perform very practical tasks which includes gathering such tools (Higher 
headquarters plan and operational graphics, map of the area of operations 
(AO), SOPs field manuals current running estimates) as would be 
required for operational planning, then update running estimates, 
especially the status of friendly forces and resources. The final task of 
this step which requires the commander and staff to conducting an initial 
assessment of the mission entails, setting the operational timeline, 
reviewing intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and running 
estimates as well as setting the time required to position critical elements. 
Once this initial assessment had been done, the commander issues an 
initial warning order (WngO) for the mission.  
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Although philosophical dialogue has been adjudged as inapplicable 
during Step 1 of the MDMP, there are other steps in the process to which 
dialogue is applicable and they include; analysis of mission, Course of 
Action COA Development, COA Analysis, COA Comparison and COA 
Approval. It is within some of the tasks that constitute these events that 
the commander engages in what the military refers to as objective 
dialogue with his staff. According to Marr, 
 
Objective dialogue is the process, by which a staff enhances, or increases, the 
experience level of the commander by discussing the positive and negative 
aspects of a potential decision. By exposing the commander – virtually – to new 
or unfamiliar situations through mental simulation, objective dialogue counteracts 
the limiting effects of experience, and assists in preventing the effects of 
uncertainty, expectations and information inhibitors as well19 
 
The above clearly illustrates why a course in Critical Thinking is an 
indispensable part of Staff College education and why it is important for 
its graduates to develop an enhanced vision of alternatives. A vision of 
alternatives is indispensable if staff officers are to adequately enhance 
and increase the experience level of the commander. This is because it is 
such a vision that will inform the preparations for their objective dialogue 
with the commander. Such a vision of alternatives is easily attainable if 
philosophical dialogue is utilized in developing the COAs for the 
different branches of the force that are participating in the mission. Thus 
in his pre-planning assessment of the operational terrain for instance, an 
intelligence officer will not only be asking his reconnaissance team for 
the usual information about the position, strength, hardware, supply route 
and morale of the enemy, the natural and manmade obstacles in the area, 
the presence of human settlements, economic infrastructure, places of 
worship, friendly forces, and so on but also about other seemingly 
irrelevant details which may enhance his vision of alternatives. What this 
means is that in debriefing the reconnaissance team, the staff officer will 
not only be interested in the bare facts but will also probe for hidden 
meanings which may not be apparent to the team at its initial assessment 
                                                          
19 MARR, Maj. John J.: The Military Decision Making Process: Making Better Decisions Versus 
Making Decisions Better, unpublished monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United 
States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
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of the terrain. This ensures that his contribution to the commander’s 
objective dialogue is rich, varied and comprehensive. 
Introducing Philosophical Dialogue into the commander’s Objective 
Dialogue process has the potential to expand the options available to the 
commander, but experience has shown that it irritates many commanders 
who view it as a waste of time. Such commanders could not understand 
the need for the extensive probing that goes with philosophical dialogue. 
For them, the dialogue puts pressure on other decision making processes 
by eating into the operational timeline which, even at the best of times, is 
usually inadequate. This is because the MDMP is, itself, is a laborious 
process. For instance, the commander and staff need to perform 41 tasks 
between the receipt of mission to the issuing of the Warning Order 
(WngO) for the mission. The tasks, a mixed bag of technical and 
analytical duties, also require interaction with other units, friendly forces 
and enemy forces. Even without the added complications of philosophical 
dialogue, commanders and staff have for a long time complained about 
the time and resources that go into using the MDMP in operational 
planning. Marr, for instance, observes that “unit performance at the U.S. 
Army’s combat training centres (CTCs) suggests that tactical units have 
difficulties in applying the MDMP,” and part of the reason for this is 
because they are too long for use in time-critical combat environments.  
This view is corroborated by Garcia when he claims that “observations 
from subject matter experts observing staffs during training indicate that 
they have difficulty conducting the military decision-making process.” It 
is therefore no surprise that the officers did not warm up to Philosophical 





Since Socratic times, philosophical dialogue has been known to improve 
the quality of reasoning and by extension the quality of decisions that 
follow from such reasoning. The attempt to use such dialogue in military 
decision making followed from this proud history and from the onset, it 
was clear that there are benefits in philosophical dialogue training, just as 
there are benefits in other aspects of military training that aims at 
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developing the intellectual outlook of the officer. There is no doubt that 
philosophical dialogue is very useful in uncovering and understanding the 
myriad of ethical issues that arise in the conduct of war. Not only does it 
help officers to be conversant with current ethical debates but it also 
enables them to test the boundaries of what is and is not ethically 
acceptable. The efficacy of philosophical dialogue in operational 
planning, on the other hand, is not as generally accepted. Despite the use, 
by commanders, of objective dialogue in operational planning, an 
indication that a dialogue process is not entirely antithetical to military 
doctrine, making such dialogue philosophical, presented challenges, 
especially for officers who are used to dealing with ‘facts.’ Although it is 
common for staff officers to query each other’s contribution to the 
commander’s objective dialogue for hidden flaws and inconsistencies, 
making the dialogue process philosophical proved to be unnecessarily 
detailed for operational planning. This is especially so in combat 
operations or war-gaming situations where decisions have to be taken 
quickly. Given the fact that opinion is evenly divided in the ongoing 
debate as to whether the quality of decisions made using an analytical 
decision making process (such as the MDMP) is superior to one made 
with an intuitive process, it is obvious that extending decision making 
time through the use of philosophical dialogue is never going to be 
popular. This is despite the general agreement that a philosophical 
dialogue process had the advantage of uncovering vital information that 
would otherwise have been lost. This notwithstanding, there is general 
agreement that making philosophical dialogue an integral part of military 
training is indeed advantageous. Those who support the intuitive method 
as the ideal decision making tool for the military argue that, a training in 
philosophical dialogue could help expand the commander’s experience, 
thereby enriching the knowledge database upon which his intuition is 
derived. Despite having doubts as to the efficacy of philosophical 
dialogue in operational planning, those who argue for an analytical 
decision making regime maintain that making philosophical dialogue part 
of military training sharpens the critical outlook of the officer and thus 
enhances his contributions to the commander’s objective dialogue. In the 
case of the intelligence officer discussed above for instance, it is clear 
that a dialogue with his team as part of their training exposes them to the 
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significance of paying attention to detail thus making the content of their 
report richer. This tends to show that philosophical dialogue could have a 





CARDON, E. C., and LEONARD, S.: “Unleashing Design: Planning and 
the Art of Battle Command”, Military Review, Vol, 16. Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, March-April 2010, pp. 2-12 
CHICAGO MILITARY ACADEMY: “E4AP Philosophy: Philosopher 
Dialogue”, available in http://www.chicagomilitaryacademy.org/ourpages 
/auto/2007/9/23/1190595536921/Philosophy%20dialogue%20example.do
c, last accessed June 17th, 2012. 
COCKERHAM, W. C. and COHER, L.E.: “Obedience to Orders: Issues 
of Morality and Legality in Combat among U.S. Army Paratroopers”, 
Social Forces, Vol. 58: 4, Oxford, 1980, pps. 1272-1288 
ERIKSEN, J.W.:  “Should Soldiers Think before They Shoot?”, Journal 
of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, Issue 3, New York, 2010, pp. 195-218 
DRUBA, V.: “The Problem of Child Soldiers”, International Review of 
Education, Vol. 48: 3, New York, 2002, pp.. 271-277  
FOTION, N. & ELFSTROM, G.: Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace 
and War, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1986. 
GAL, R.: A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier. Greenwood Press, New York, 
1986. 
GARCIA, J.A..: “The Requirement for an Abbreviated Military Decision-
Making Process in Doctrine”, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, San 
Francisco State University, San Francisco, California, 1980. 
HUNTINGTON, S. P.: The Soldier and the State, Belknap Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 1985. 
LEWIS, D. & LEWIS, S.: “Holes”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
48:2, 1970, pp. 206-212 
MARR, J.J.: “The Military Decision Making Process: Making Better 
Decisions Versus Making Decisions Better”, unpublished monograph, 
School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and 
General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2001. 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 6, 2015, pp. 29-51  
PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE AND MILITARY DECISION MAKING 51 
PAZ, R. D.: “A Systems Critique of the Military Decision-Making 
Process at the Operational Level of War”, Unpublished  Monograph, 
United States Army,  School of Advanced Military Studies, United States 
Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
2003. 
ROOCHNIK,  D. L.: “The Impossibility of Philosophical Dialogue”, 
Philosophy & Rhetoric  Vol. 19, No. 3, University Park, PA, 1986, pags. 
147 – 165. 
SARKESIAN, S. C.: Beyond the Battlefield: The new Military 
Professionalism, Pergamon Press, New York, 1981. 
TILL, G. - BOWEN, W. - HALL, D. - Burridge Air Vice-Marshal Brian, 
“Post modern Military education: Are we meeting the challenge”? 
Defence Studies vol 1:1, London, 2001, pp. 1-18. 
UNICEF: “Factsheet: Child Soldiers”, available in 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdf , last accessed May 
14th, 2013. 
VILKKA, J.: “An example of philosophical discussion / Free Will and 
Determinism”, available in http://personal.inet.fi/koti/jouni_vilkka/ 
ExampleDialogue.htm, last accessed May 15th, 2013. 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 6, 2015, pp. 29-51 
IBANGA B. IKPE 
 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 6, 2015, pp. 29-51 
52
 
 
 
 
